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G. L. DeLacy *
I. INTRODUCTION
An editorial appeared on February 5, 1959, in the Omaha
World Herald. The editorial was entitled "Not One Defender'
The writer set out the severe criticism of the Supreme Court of
the United States in the Senate by Senator Russell of Georgia
to the effect that the court was "highhanded," "power-mad," "Bent
on a cynical, heartless, cruel and almost sadistic effort to impose
mixed schools on the South."
The editorial then said that not a Senator arose to defend
the Court, not even the loudest supporter of school integration.
The writer then asked this question:
Strange, isn't it, that there should be no answer?
The editorial writer then finally concluded:
Add them all together, there are few in the Congress who
still regard the Court with awe and respect.
It has been my good fortune to appear before the Supreme
Court on several occasions and I am ever mindful of its great
contribution towards making America the greatest nation on the
face of the earth. I regard the Court Room of that Court as holy
ground. I worry a great deal about the criticism of the personnel
of the Court and of its opinions which currently appear in the
press. I particularly notice the bitter comments contained in the
World Herald and the comments of its commentator David Law-
rence.
It is obvious that these attacks stem from the decision of the
United States Supreme Court in what is known as the "Segrega-
tion Case," Brown v. The Board of Education' decided in May,
1954.
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As a member of the Bar, I feel that active steps should be
taken to correct the reaction resulting from the unwarranted at-
tacks upon the Court and the attendant unfavorable publicity
and I, likewise, feel that someone should rise from the Bar at this
time as a defender of that Court. I have the opinion that the
Southern Senators and lawyers, so critical of the decision in the
Segregation Cases, are attempting to discredit the Court and in
so doing weaken the effect of its decisions and judgments.
Brown v. The Board of Education,2 in effect, prohibits segre-
gation in public schools solely because of color when that segrega-
tion is permitted or required by State Statutes and this even
though equal educational facilities are furnished to negroes.
A. EARLY CRIcisM
The effect of early criticism of the decision is evidenced by
the adoption in 1956 of a Declaration of Constitutional principles
by 19 United States Senators and 77 members of the House of
Representatives. Most of these Senators and Representatives were
from southern states. This Declaration referred to "the unwar-
ranted decision of the Supreme Court in the public school cases
and stated that the decision was a clear abuse of judicial power.
It said the Supreme Court was undertaking to legislate and substi-
tute the personal, political and social ideas of its members for the
established law of the land. The signers pledged themselves to
the use of lawful means to bring about a reversal of this decision,
asserting that it is contrary to the Constitution. The pronounce-
ment was the beginning of a torrent of violent comments.
A number of the legislatures of the southern states adopted
resolutions denouncing the Supreme Court. On February 22,
1957 the General Assembly of Georgia passed a resolution request-
ing the impeachment of six members of the United States Supreme
Court. Copies of this resolution were broadcast throughout the
country by an agency of the State of Georgia, which is called the
Georgia Commission on Education. This opposition to the inte-
gration of negroes into tax-supported schools is reminiscent of
the opposition to the Emancipation Proclamation of President
Lincoln. Following its issuance, his party at the next elections
suffered overwhelming defeats in Ohio, Indiana and Illinois. The
Democrats at that time issued what they called an address to the
Democracy of the United States which was, in effect, a platform
for the Western Democracy.
2 Ibid.
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This manifesto advocated principles of strict construction of
the Constitution with due regard to state's rights and jealous
limitations of governmental powers and non-interference anywhere
by the Federal Government with the institution of slavery. The
manifesto indicated that they were opposed to the war if it was
for the purpose of overthrowing or interfering with the estab-
lished rights or established institutions of any state.
The Legislature of Lincoln's own state resolved that the
proclamation was:
A gigantic usurpation, at once converting the war professedly
commenced by the administration for the vindication of the
authority of the Constitution, into a crusade for the sudden,
unconditional and violent liberation of 3,000,000 Negro slaves;
a result which would not only be total subversion of the Fed-
eral Union but a resolution in the social organization of the
Southern states, the immediate and remote, the present and
far reaching consequences of which to both races cannot be
contemplated without the most dismal foreboding of horror and
dismay.
II. THE SEGREGATION CASES
The appeals involved actions originally brought in Kansas,
South Carolina, Virginia, Delaware and the District of Columbia.
The causes were presented to the Supreme Court at the same
hearings (there were two hearings) and the decision rendered
in 1954, after re-argument and consideration by the Court. The
consolidated case is generally known as Brown v. The Board of
Education.3 The opinion, written by Chief Justice Warren, was
unanimous. It is significant to note that two of the present Judges
of the Supreme Court are from the Fifth Circuit which comprises
the Gulf States from Florida through Texas. They were born
and reared in the climate of segregation, one in Texas and the
other in Alabama. Neither dissented in any of the cases. The
appeal from the District of Columbia will not be discussed as
that case was decided on the issue of the 5th Amendment.
The cases involved the Constitutional question of whether
a state may pass a statute which requires or permits the segregation
of negro students into separate public schools, assuming facilities
furnished negro students in separate schools were equal to those
furnished in schools reserved for whites.
It was vigorously asserted by the plaintiffs that negro children




of the laws within the meaning of the 14th Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States adopted in he year 1868.
The 14th Amendment states:
... No State shall make or enforce any law which shall
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of laws....
This requires equality of treatment before the law of all per-
sons without regard to color.4
This amendment was not a mere legalism or empty pretense.
It was a clear expression of the conscience of America, directly
in accord with the stream of American tradition and aspiration
and pronounced at a time which followed the tragedy of a Civil
War.
The Court had no control over the timing of the personal
sense of frustration which set in motion the lawsuits under dis-
cussion which came before the Court in 1952. The issue was
squarely presented and required a decision.
It was to be expected that the changing status of the negro
and the experience arising out of two wars would provoke at-
tempts to have carried into effect the promises of equality con-
tained in the amendments adopted after the Civil War.
III. QUESTION INVOLVED
Now the question is-did state statutes requiring or permitting
segregation in public schools on account of color, deprive the
colored children of the equal protection of the laws? Remember
the schools involved were public schools supported by taxation.
The cases involved in the Brown case that came up from Kansas,
South Carolina, Virginia and the District of Columbia were ap-
peals from the United States District Courts in those areas. These
courts had held against the negro plaintiffs in their suits to force
admittance into white schools, basing their decisions on the case
of Plessy v. Ferguson,5 decided in 1896. This case involved public
transportation and the Court at that time held that the furnishing
to negroes of separate but equal facilities in railroad transportation
did not violate the 14th Amendment, that is, the Court held the
4 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879) holding that Negroes
must be permitted an opportunity to serve on juries.
G 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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requirement that negroes ride in separate coaches on railroad
trains did not offend the Constitution if the facilities were equal.
The Delaware case (one of the consolidated cases) was an
appeal from the Supreme Court of that State. This case was
affirmed. The lower Court had ordered the immediate admission
of colored students into white schools. The Supreme Court of
Delaware held the school for negroes not equal to schools for
whites.
The Federal Judge before whom the case was tried in Kansas
made this finding:
Segregation of white and colored children in public schools
has a detrimental effect upon the colored children. The im-
pact is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy
of separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the
inferiority of the negro. A sense of inferiority affects the moti-
vation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of the
law, therefore, has a tendency to retard the educational and
mental development of negro children and to deprive them of
some of the benefits they would receive in a racially integrated
school system.
In the opinion by Chief Justice Warren, he said, after quoting
this finding of the Kansas Judge:
Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowl-
edge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply sup-
ported by modern authority.
The Chief Justice then stated:
Any language in Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding
is rejected.
He further stated:
We conclude that in the field of Public Education the doctrine
of 'separate but equal' has no place. Separate educational facilities
are inherently unequal. Therefore we hold that the plaintiffs
and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been
brought are by reason of the segregation complained of deprived
of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the 14th Amend-
ment.
IV. REVERSAL OF PLESSY V. FERGUSON
Complaint has been made that the Supreme Court erred in
not following the rule announced in Plessy v. Ferguson., Was
the 1954 decision wrong? The Court had to decide the case at
that time when presented to it. Did the Supreme Court in inter-
6 Ibid, overruled by 352 U.S. 903 (1956).
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preting the Constitution of the United States in the segregation
case decide the case not on legal precedents, but on the opinion
of sociologists?
Current criticism claims that the high tribunal decided the
case not on the law, but on sociology. It has been said that such
critics are not concerned that social values are being taken into
account by the Court, but that the Court has not accepted the
critic's own social values. The sociologist who believes in racial
segregation has a grievance against the Supreme Court, but the
grievance is not that the Court made a choice between views on
race relations but that the Court made its choice against the
critic's views.7
It would appear that the rationale of the Court in the Kansas
case is sound, logical and inescapable.
V. TREND SINCE PLESSY V. FERGUSON
It is interesting to observe the trend of the decisions in the
Supreme Court since the 1896 opinion involving railroad transpor-
tation. In 1938 it was held in Gaines v. Canadas that the Missouri
practice of offering to negro students payment out of the public
funds for tuition costs in schools in adjacent states, when those
students (because of their color) could not secure professional
training in state-supported Missouri colleges and universities,
violated the principles of the 14th Amendment.
Again in 1948 in the case of Sipuel v. Board of Regents of the
University of Oklahoma,9 the case before the Court involved the
following facts: A negro, concededly qualified, applied for ad-
mission to the School of Law of the University of Oklahoma, the
only law school maintained by the taxpayers of the state.
This application was denied solely because of the color of
the applicant. The applicant then applied to the state courts for
a Writ of Mandamus compelling the university to accept her as
a law student. This was denied by the state courts. An appeal
was taken to the Supreme Court of the United States. The de-
cision was reversed and the Court held:
The State must provide it (legal education) for her in con-
formity with the equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment
and provide it as soon as it does for applicants of any other group.
7 Comment by Robert Leflar, Professor, Arkansas Law School.
s 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
9 332 U.S. 631 (1948).
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In the case of Sweatt v. Painter,0 a negro was refused ad-
mission to the University of Texas Law School on the ground that
substantially equivalent facilities were offered by a Texas Law
School open only to negroes. Mr. Chief Justice Vinson of the
United States Supreme Court delivered the opinion. The Court
refused either to affirm or disaffirm the doctrine of Plessy v.
Ferguson," but held that the equal protection clause required
that the negro be admitted to the Texas Law School since the
school for negroes did not afford equal facilities. However, this
conclusion rested on grounds which made it unlikely that it would
be possible for a state to establish a law school for negroes alone
which afforded equal facilities. The Court relied in part on these
qualities which are incapable of objective measurement but which
make for greatness in a law school. The case was decided in
June, 1950.
In the same month, the decision of McLaurin v. Oklahoma
State Regents of the University of Oklahoma,12 was decided. The
opinion in this case was also written by Mr. Chief Justice Vinson.
In this case the negro was admitted to the school, but was required
to sit at a separate desk in the hall, apart from the other students,
etc. The restrictions on the engro were in accordance with the
statutory requirements of Oklahoma. Mr. Chief Justice Vinson
used the following language:
Our society grows increasingly complex, and our need for
trained leaders increases correspondingly. Appellant's case repre-
sents, perhaps the epitome of that need, for he is attempting to
obtain an advanced degree in education, to become by definition,
a leader and trainer of others. Those who will come under his
guidance and influence must be directly affected by the education
he receives. Their own education and development will neces-
sarily suffer to the extent that his training is unequal to that of
his classmates. State-imposed restrictions which produce such
inequalities cannot be sustained.
It may be argued that appellant will be in no better position
when these restrictions are removed, for he may still be set apart
by his fellow students. This we think irrelevant. There is a vast
difference-a Constitutional difference-between restrictions im-
posed by the state which prohibit the intellectual commingling of
students, and the refusal of individuals to commingle where the
state presents no such bar. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13, 14,
92 L. Ed. 1161, 1180, 1181, 68 S. Ct. 826, 3 A.L.R. 2d 441 (1948). The
removal of the state restrictions will not necessarily abate indi-
vidual and group predilections, prejudices and choices.
10 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
11 Note 6 supra.
12 339 U.S. 637 (1950).
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But at the very least, the state will not be depriving appel-
lant of the opportunity to secure acceptance by his fellow students
on his own merits.
We conclude that the conditions under which this appellant
is required to receive his education deprive him of his personal
and present right to the equal protection of the laws. See Sweatt
v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, ante 1114, 70 S. Ct. 842. We hold that
under these circumstances the Fourteenth Amendment precludes
differences in treatment by the state based upon race. Appellant,
having been admitted to a state-supported graduate school, must
receive the same treatment at the hands of the state as students
of other races. The judgment is reversed.
In the case of Henderson v. United States, et al,13 decided in
1950, four years before the segregation cases were decided, the
Court outlawed the practice of railroads of dividing a dining car
so as to allow ten tables for white passengers and one table ex-
clusively for negro passengers. The regulation also called for
a partition between the tables. The Court held that this sub-
jected the colored passengers to undue or unreasonable prejudice
in violation of the Interstate Commerce Act. It was likewise
held that the City of Miami could not meet the test of the Four-
teenth Amendment by furnishing the facilities of their municipal
golf courses to negroes on a segregated basis, Rice v. Arnold.
14
To the same effect is a case later in 1954 involving a city park.15
These cases were decided on the theory that if the state is going
to provide such facilities at all, it must provide them equally to
the citizens. In the case of Morgan v. Virginia,'6 decided prior
to the segregation cases, the Court held that the attempt of a state
to require the segregation of passengers in interstate buses re-
sulted in the imposition of an undue burden on interstate com-
merce. This decision was not based on any claimed Constitutional
provision.
It appears that the Supreme Court of the United States, when
presented with the specific question involved in the public school
cases could not, in the light of its prior decisions in the Sweatt
case 47 and the McLaurin case,' 8 and enlightened modern thinking
on the subject have held otherwise.
13 339 U.S. 816 (1950).
14 340 U.S. 848 (1950).
15 Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Assn., 347 U.S. 971 (1954).
10 328 U.S. 373 (1946).
17 Note 10 supra.
1 Note 12 supra.
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Mr. Chief Justice Warren in writing the opinion followed
the trend set forth in the cases of Sweatt v. Painter and McLaurin
v. Oklahoma State Regents, supra, and also followed the finding
set forth in the case appealed from Kansas, discussed earlier.
He also considered the cases appealed from Delaware, i.e., the
case of Belton v. Gebhart and Bulah v. Gebhart (Consolidated).1
The Delaware cases involved the question of whether the State
of Delaware through its agencies violated the rights of negroes
under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
to the United States Constitution. The negro plaintiffs who
brought these actions had been refused admission to the Claymont
High School, a public school maintained by the State of Delaware
for white children only. They were refused admission solely
because of their color and ancestry. However, they were per-
mitted to attend the Howard High School and the Carver Voca-
tional School, both operated by the School District and both oper-
ated for negro children. In the trial of the cases the plaintiffs
introduced expert witnesses as to the effect of segregation. These
experts sustained the general proposition that the effect of legally
enforced segregation in education upon negro children was harmful.
The Delaware Court in the opinion says:
The other experts sustained the general proposition as to the
harmful over-all effect of legally enforced segregation in education
upon Negro children generally. It is no answer to this finding to
point to numerous Negroes who apparently have not been so
harmed. It leads to lack of interest, extensive absenteeism, mental
disturbances, etc. Indeed, the harm may often show up in ways
not connected with their 'formal' education progress. The fact is
that such practice creates a mental health problem in many Negro
children with a resulting impediment to their educational progress.
Defendants say that the evidence shows that the State may
not be 'ready' for nonsegregated education, and that a social
problem cannot be solved with legal force.
Assuming the validity of the contention without for a minute
conceding the sweeping factual assumption, nevertheless, the
contention does not answer the fact that the Negro's mental health
and therefore, his educational opportunities are adversely affected
by State-imposed segregation in education. The application of
Constitutional principals is often distasteful to some citizens, but
that is one reason for Constitutional guarantees. The principles
override transitory passions.
(1) I conclude that the testimony that in our Delaware
society, State-imposed segregation in education itself results in the
Negro children, as a class, receiving educational opportunities
which are substantially inferior to those available to white children
otherwise similarly situated.
19 32 Del. Ch. 343, 87 A.2d 862 (1952).
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It is apparent that in these segregation cases the Court was
again required to interpret the 14th Amendment to the United
States Constitution. It had to determine when the question was
presented whether state statutes which required or permitted
the furnishing of separate, although equal, facilities for education
to whites and blacks in public schools was a violation of that amend-
ment. It was required to do this in the years 1952 and 1954.
These segregation cases certainly arose under the Constitution.
The Court had to apply the generalities of the amendment in the
cases before it. They involved the specific proposition of whether
or not the state statutes involved deprived the plaintiffs of the
equal protection of the laws as guaranteed by the 14th Amendment.
The Supreme Court could not equivocate. There could be no
retreat. The Court, based on sound legal reasoning, in effect said:
Compliance with the 14th Amendment means more than lip
service; it means that the protection afforded all citizens must
be equal.
Why this unavoidable moral and legal conclusion should
shock any right thinking citizen of a country dedicated to the
proposition that all men are created equal is inconceivable. In
the Declaration of Independence, adopted by the Thirteen Colonies
on July 4, 1776, it was provided:
We hold these truths to be self-evident that all men are
created equal.
VI. OTHER CASES INVOLVING RIGHTS OF NEGROES
SINCE ADOPTION OF 14TH AMENDMENT-1868
It should be recognized that the segregation decisions are the
culmination of a long line of decisions involving the application
of the concept of equal protection of the laws.
In 1880 the right of negroes to be included on juries had to be
established by a judicial decision of the Supreme Court. In this
case Mr. Justice Strong said in referring to the 14th Amendment
to the Constitution of the United States in Strauder v. West Va.:
20
It ordains that no State shall make or enforce any laws which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States (evidently referring to the newly made citizens, who,
being citizens of the United States are declared to be also citizens
of the State in which they reside). It ordains that no State shall
deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law, or deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
20 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
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tection of the laws. What is this but declaring that the law in the
States shall be the same for the black as for the white; that all
persons, whether colored or white shall stand equal before the
laws of the States, and, in regard to the colored race, for whose
protection the Amendment was primarily designed, that no dis-
crimination shall be made against them by law because of their
color? The words of the Amendment, it is true, are prohibitory,
but they contain a necessary implication of a positive immunity,
or right, most valuable to the colored race-the right to exemption
from unfriendly legislation against them distinctively as colored;
exemption from legal discriminations, implying inferiority in civil
society, lessening the security of their enjoyment of the rights
which others enjoy, and discriminations which are steps towards
reducing them to the condition of a subject race.
In 1917 racial restrictions in municipal zoning laws were held
by the same court unconstitutional in Buchanan v. Warley,2 1 and
in 1948 this principle was applied to prevent the enforcement of
private racial covenants involving housing. Shelley v. Kraemer.22
In 1927 the first of a series of cases outlawing the all-white primary
under the 14th Amendment was decided and in 1938 the first
cases applied the principle of equal protection to higher education.
Through Chief Justice Hughes, the Court held that a state did
not satisfy its constitutional duty by offering to pay for a negro
student's tuition at a nonsegregated university in another state.2 3
The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment was de-
liberately couched in general terms. It speaks in general terms
and those are as comprehensive as possible. It did not specifically
mention education, jury service, transportation on railroad trains
or any of the other specific fields in which the Court has been
faced with racially restrictive laws. The Court was required to
decide the cases involving such restrictive laws. The "Equal Pro-
tection of the Law" clause is not self defining.
VII. REVERSAL OF PLESSY V. FERGUSON
Critics of the decision especially condemn the disregarding
of the rule laid down in that case although decisions are but evi-
dence of the law and not the law itself.
A. STARE DECISIS
The Supreme Court has the right to reverse the rule of law
stated in prior judicial precedents whenever, in the judgment of
21 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
22 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
23 Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1939).
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the Court, such reversal is necessary to correct previous error or
to interpret more accurately the meaning and to apply more ef-
fectively the purpose of Constitutional provisions. Such a reversal
may be necessitated as the result of experience and by the im-
pact of changing political, economic, technological or social con-
ditions in a complex and dynamic society or by the evolution of
a clearer understanding and deeper appreciation of the moral
and social values and legal rights implicit in the Constitutional
provisions themselves.
As to this right, it has been said:
This will always be true, at least until such time as society
ceases to grow, knowledge ceases to advance and the Supreme
Court becomes infallible.
The Supreme Court has overruled sixty decisions in the Con-
stitutional law area since its beginning-it has overruled ninety
altogether. Some opinions had not been overruled for over 90
years. There is no limit to the right to overrule a prior decision.
The law is a progressive science.
In considering the question of whether a prior opinion should
be overruled Dean Roscoe Pound observes "We must seek prin-
ciples of change no less than principles of stability."
It has been said:
The inn that shelters for the night is not the Journey's End;
the law like a traveler must be ready for the morrow. It must
have a principle of growth.
Judges Stone and Cardozo explained in the opinion in St.
Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States24 that "the doctrine of
'stare decisis' has only a limited application in the field of Con-
stitutional law."
Mr. Justice Douglas of the Supreme Court in an article on
"stare decisis"25 likewise observed:
The place of stare decisis in Constitutional law is even more
tenuous. A Judge looking at a Constitutional question may have
compulsions to revere past history and to accept what was once
written. But he remembers above all else that it is the Constitu-
tion which he swore to support and defend not the gloss which
his predecessors may have put on it-he cannot do otherwise unless
he lets men long dead and unaware of the problems of the age in
which he lives do his thinking for him.
24 298 U.S. 38 (1936).
20 49 Col. Law Rev. 736 (1949).
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In an article by Albert P. Blaustein, Associate Professor of
Law, Rutgers Law School, assisted by Andrew H. Field of Rutgers 26
entitled "Overruling Opinions in the Supreme Court" the author
says:
The last decision of the Supreme Court consistent with the
Plessy spirit-but by no means a reaffirmance of the Plessy
holding was Gong Lum v. Rice in 1927 (275 U.S. 78). Thus, with
the possible exception of the Korematsu determination (Decision
in 1944 based on wartime powers and emergencies 323 U.S. 214)
it can safely be said that every Supreme Court decision since
1927 involving racial discrimination constituted some erosion of
the Plessy doctrine.
Just as an overruling is 'necessary' in resolving prior conflict-
ing precedents, so an overruling is at least 'justified' where the
Court must choose between following a precedent and following
a contrary philosophy expressed in other cases. The Court in the
school segregation case of Brown v. Board of Education and the
transportation case of Gayle v. Browder finally overruled Plessy
v. Ferguson. And the Court was severely criticized for its depart-
urefrom this acknowledged precedent. But what the critics
failed to realize was that adherence to the 1896 case of Plessy v.
Ferguson would have resulted in a decision contrary to the phil-
osophy and spirit of at least four cases involving Negro rights
in education, decided between 1938 and 1950. Faced with the
task of determining the constitutionality of laws based on racial
segregation, the Supreme Court could not have reconciled all of
the prior cases on the subject. Some decision or decisions had
to be overruled-at least in spirit.
B. No BASIS FOR THE PLESSY DECISION
It appears that the development of the law, as evidenced
by the cases which have been cited, eroded away whatever basis
there was for the Plessy decision and compelled the Supreme
Court of the United States to hold, when directly confronted with
the question, that to require by law children of a citizen, simply
because of the color of their skin, to attend a separate public
school from that attended by their white brothers violated the
equal protection of the law clause of our constitution.
The Court, in coming to this conclusion, could not be con-
clusively swayed by the fact that there would be much opposition
to its conclusion and that there would result many problems in
enforcing the rule laid down by the Court.
In the Court's opinion in Cooper v. Aaron2 7 the Court cited,
as authority for the proposition that the Constitution cannot yield
26 57 Mich. Law Rev. - (1958).
27 358 U.S. 28 (1958).
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because of possible violent resistance, the 1917 case entitled Bu-
chanan v. Warley.28 In this case the Court held unconstitutional
a city ordinance of the City of Louisville, Kentucky, prohibiting
any colored person from moving into and occupying as a resi-
dence any house in a block in which a greater number of houses
were occupied by persons of the opposite race.
The title of the Ordinance in question was:
An ordinance to prevent conflict and ill-feeling between the
white and colored races in the City of Louisville, and to preserve
the public peace and promote the general welfare, by making
reasonable provisions requiring, as far as practicable, the use
of separate blocks, for residences, places of abode, and places of
assembly by white and colored people respectively.
In the opinion the Court said:
That there exists a serious and difficult problem arising
from a feeling of race hostility which the law is powerless to con-
trol, and to which it must give a measure of consideration, may
be freely admitted. But its solution cannot be promoted by de-
priving citizens of their constitutional rights and privileges.
It is urged that this proposed segregation will promote the
public peace by preventing race conflicts. Desirable as this is,
and important as is the preservation of the public peace, this aim
cannot be accomplished by laws or ordinances which deny rights
created or protected by the Federal Constitution.
Considering the background involved, did or did not the de-
cision in the Segregation Cases come at an appropriate time?
Assuming that the negro is a citizen and assuming that un-
der the Constitution he is really entitled to the equal protection
of the laws and that no state may pass a statute denying him
the equal protection of the laws, must there not come a time
when in all sections of our country, where he is allowed to vote,
where he is not required to ride in the back of a bus and where, at
least by public statute, his children are not required to go to separate
schools from those provided for white children simply because
of their color.
It would appear dangerous to allow millions of citizens to
be second-rate citizens and to discriminate against them. One
can readily see that the loyalty of such a citizen might be affected
if he, although he had educated himself, is still required by ordi-
nance to ride in the back of the bus, is still required to send his
children to a separate school and where, in some sections of the
country, he is not allowed to vote and where he is otherwise dis-
28 Note 21 supra.
1030
"SEGREGATION CASES" SUPREME COURT
criminated against simply because he was born with a dark skin
although he is drafted into the armed forces and is compelled to
defend his country with his life.
Likewise, is it not a good thing to strengthen the concept that
justice requires equality of treatment under the law without
prejudice because of race, religion or national origin? You will
remember the prophetic dissent of Judge Harlan in the Plessy
v. Ferguson2 9 case wherein he said: "The Constitution is color
blind."
VIII. SEPTEMBER 30TH OPINION OF SUPREME COURT
On September 11, 1958, there was heard by the Supreme
Court of the United States an appeal from the Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit.30 The Court of Appeals reversed a de-
cision of the lower court 3' which had suspended for 21/ years the
operation of the School Board's (Little Rock) Court approved
desegregation program.32 On September 12, 1958, the decision
of the Circuit Court of Appeals was affirmed by the Supreme
Court.33 The opinion, however, was not handed down until Sep-
tember 29, at which time the Supreme Court unanimously re-
affirmed its school segregation decisions of 1954 and 1955.
This decision, 34 reiterated in strong and clear language that
the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Constitution is the law
and that the decision ordering at least a prompt and good faith
start on the court approved plan to eventually desegregate schools
in Little Rock, stands and that neither direct nullification nor
indirect evasion will be tolerated. It should be noted that the
Court indicated that a District Court might conclude that justi-
fication existed for not requiring the present nonsegregated ad-
mission of all qualified negro children, the Court indicated that
what is demanded is a "good faith" and "prompt start" toward
ultimately complete desegregation which might take years, as some
schemes already approved by District Courts will surely do.
(Little Rock Plan is to be completed by 1963).
29 Note 6 supra.
30 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 28 (1958).
31 Aaron v. Cooper, 163 F. Supp. 13 (1958).
32 Aaron v. Cooper, 257 F.2d 33 (1958).
33 Note 30 supra.
84 Note 30 supra.
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It is worthy of note that since the original Brown case three
new justices have come to the Supreme Court. These new Justices
agreed with the other Justices still on the Supreme Court in ar-
riving at a unanimous decision reaffirming the original case.
IX. PHILOSOPHY
The philosophy upon which this Republic was founded as-
sumed the essential equality of the citizen. I assume that that
philosophy was in part based on the Christian belief that all men
-white, black, red, brown and yellow-were created by God for
the intimate association with him ultimately for all Eternity, this
notwithstanding any accidental or temporary differences, be they
physical, intellectual, economic or racial. This thought, in part,
was expressed as early as the Declaration of Independence. It
may be of interest to present the opinion from the moral stand-
point of a Great Christian Church, i.e., the Catholic Church. In
this Church what is known as the Red Mass is traditionally of-
fered for the sanctification of the new Court Year. A sermon
was preached at a Red Mass by William J. Knealy, S.J. in the
Cathedral of New Orleans to the members of the Louisiana Bench
and Bar in December, 1956. The segregation case had been de-
cided in 1954. It took courage for this church to take the stand
it did on segregation and to announce it so soon after the decision
and in a Cathedral in New Orleans. Jesuit Knealy at the end of
his sermon stated:
The position of the Catholic Church has been clearly and
courageously stated by His Excellency, the Archbishop of New
Orleans. The philosophy of the natural law has always been em-
braced and elevated by the theology of the Church Universal.
Popes, archbishops, bishops, dogmatic and moral theologians, the
unanimous judgment of the teaching Church is that compulsory
segregation is objectively and morally wrong. It is a cancer in
the body politic. It is a desecration of Christian civilization.
We like to think that God is on the side of our American way
of life; but it is true only to the extent that our American way
of life is on the side of Him who said, 'I am the way, the truth
and the life.' In the eyes of God there is neither white nor black
nor red nor yellow nor brown; neither Jew nor Gentile nor bar-
barian nor Scythian; but all are brothers in Christ Jesus. 'By
this will all men know that you are my disciples, if you have
love one for another.'
The New York Times in an editorial said of the cases under
discussion:
What the Supreme Court has said will stand because it is
true and because it meets the ethical test of our traditions. It
is time for men of wrath to draw aside and for reason and toler-
ance to take over.
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The editorial in the World Herald, heretofore referred to,
likewise mentioned criticisms based on the claim that decisions
of the Supreme Court made more difficult the investigation of
the activities of Communists and made their prosecution more
difficult. The editorial writer was, undoubtedly, referring to the
opinions of the Supreme Court of the United States in the cases
known as the Nelson case, the Jencks case and the Yates case.
X. NELSON CASE
This is the case of Pennsylvania v. Nelson,35 where the Court
held that the adoption by Congress of the Smith Act had super-
seded state statutes in the field of subversion. There is, of course,
nothing novel or startling in this decision. The same general con-
clusion has been reached before in literally hundreds of cases.
The point actually decided in the Nelson case was that the Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania could not maintain a prosecution un-
der its act for subversion against the Federal Government after
Congress had provided for such prosecutions in the Smith Act.3
Why should a state prosecute for a conspiracy to overthrow
the United States Government when Congress has made provision
for prosecution in such cases by Federal authorities and in the
Federal Courts? Such conspiracies to overthrow the national
government have interstate ramifications and are surely in more
experienced and better informed hands when they are handled
by Federal authorities. Moreover, the Supreme Court simply
affirmed the decision of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. The
Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that the State of Pennsylvania
was without authority to prosecute under its statute for a con-
spiracy to overthrow the Federal Government. In the case it is
made clear that none of the testimony had anything to do with
state governments, but all the testimony had to do with a conspiracy
to overthrow the Federal Government. There is nothing novel
in this doctrine and there is certainly nothing to warrant the
criticism that swept through the press following this decision.
I suggest that if state officers have information of subversion
against the United States Government that there is no reason
to think that it will not get full attention from the F.B.I. and other
agencies of the Federal Government. Why should it be the re-
sponsibility of the states to prosecute for offenses directed against
the United States Government? The state still has complete
35 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
36 62 Stat. 808 (1948), 18 U.S.C. 2385.
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power to prosecute under its own Act for a conspiracy to over-
throw the state government.
XI. YATES CASE
This is the case of Yates v. United States.37 The opinion was
written by Mr. Justice Harlan and was handed down in June,
1957. The case was heard on appeal from the lower court wherein
fourteen defendants were convicted of having violated the Smith
Act, that is, advocating the overthrow of the United States Govern-
ment. The cases as against five of the defendants were reversed
and dismissed for lack of evidence. As to the other defendants,
their cases were sent back for retrial. These cases were reversed
in part because of instructions to the jury given by the trial judge.
It will be remembered that before this case reached the Su-
preme Court there was a case known as the Dennis case3" which
was instituted during the administration of President Truman.
This case was tried before Judge Medina. The defendants were
convicted under the Smith Act. The convictions were upheld in
the Court of Appeals by Chief Justice Learned Hand and there-
after the Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question
of the constitutionality of the Smith Act and by a vote of six to
two the Court affirmed the convictions. I mention the Dennis
case because Judge Medina gave instructions requiring that the
advocacy of the overthrow of the Federal Government be in words
reasonably and ordinarily tending to incite to forcible action at
some future time, that is, Judge Medina distinguished between
advocacy of an abstract doctrine and advocacy directed at promot-
ing unlawful action.
In the trial of the Yates case,39 the attorneys for the Govern-
ment and the attorneys for the defendants both requested the
Court to give the Medina instructions. The trial court refused
and the Supreme Court held that the lower court erred in such
refusal.
As Judge Hand says in his book "The Bill of Rights" in com-
menting on the Yates case:
The Supreme Court made a distinction between words that
advocate concrete action and those that advocate principles di-
vorced from action.
37 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
38 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
39 Note 37 supra.
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Judge Harlan in commenting on the Dennis case4" stated the
case held that advocacy employing language of incitement is not
constitutionally protected (by the 1st Amendment) when the
group is of sufficient size and cohesiveness to justify apprehension.
As to the five that were cleared, Mr. Justice Harlan said:
So far as this record shows none of them have engaged in or
been associated with any but what appear to have been wholly
lawful activities, or has ever made a single remark or been present
when someone else made a remark which would tend to prove the
charges against them.
The issue in the Dennis case was the reconciliation of the free
speech guaranty in the Constitution with convictions under a
statute which treated speaking and teaching as criminal offenses.
The eleven in the Dennis case had taken no action with the im-
mediate intention of initiating a revolution. The convictions could
be upheld only if the speech was by judicial standards sufficiently
related to the possibility of illegal action.
Judge Hand in his book "The Bill of Rights" in commenting
on the Yates case said:
It would be difficult, indeed perhaps it would be impossible,
to imagine an occasion on which the statute would make the advo-
cate of principles divorced from action a principal in a crime.
At any rate in the Yates case the Supreme Court held that the
judge's instructions to the jury furnished wholly inadequate guid-
ance and supplied a reason why the convictions could not be al-
lowed to stand and ordered that nine of the cases be sent back
for retrial.
The Smith Act likewise made it unlawful to organize a group
which advocates the overthrow of Government by force and
violence. The defendants were charged with both organization
and advocacy. Mr. Justice Harlan held that the term organize in
the act referred to the actual formation of the American Com-
munist Party, an event which took place in 1945. The date of
the indictment was 1951. Therefore the Court held that the three-
year Statute of Limitations had run on that part of the charge.
Amendments may be passed by the Congress to broaden the
scope of the Smith Act and to more specifically define the mean-
ing of its terms and more precisely express the intentions of Con-
gress. These amendments will, of course, be attempted in a
manner to avoid the hurdles of the first amendment to the Con-
stitution and the due process of law amendment.




This is the case of Jencks v. United States.41 In this case
Jencks, a Labor Union Official, filed a non-Communist affidavit
with the National Labor Relations Board in 1950. The Govern-
ment charged that the affidavit was false and it presented two
witnesses in Court to establish his connection with the Party. The
witnesses were informers paid by the F.B.I. who had made oral
and written reports to the F.B.I. concerning Jencks. A witness of
this character testified and counsel for the defendant wanted to
see his report to compare what the witness had said at the time
with his testimony in Court, hoping to impeach his testimony.
Consequently, counsel requested, after the witness had testified
and after he had stated that he had made written reports to the
F.B.I. of the facts concerning which he testified, that the reports
be produced by the Government for inspection by the trial judge
who was to examine it for materiality and relevancy and then
to turn over to the defense such materials as met these tests. This
request was refused. Mr. Justice Brennan held that the refusal
was error. I submit that this decision seems elementary to those
of you who have engaged in the trial of cases wherein a witness
testified to certain facts and then admitted on cross examination
that he had previously given a written statement to the other side
about the very same facts he testified about. Why should not the
defense counsel have a right to demand that the Government
produce the statement? Defendant's counsel have a right to im-
peach the witness if the testimony differs from the statement.
How could a decent system of criminal trials exist on any other
basis. Yet this decision was attacked by those who never read
the opinion on the ground that it opened up the F.B.I. files to the
Communists, crooks, etc. The opinion did nothing of the kind.
Dean Griswold of the Harvard Law School in commenting on
this case said:
The witness in the Jencks case was Harvey Matusow. Sup-
pose your client was being convicted on Harvey Matusow's testi-
mony, and you knew that he had made a previous statement to
the F.B.I. Wouldn't you want to see that statement? Wouldn't
you regard it as highly unfair and improper if you were not al-
lowed to see the statement? Is there any lawyer who can seriously
say that the Supreme Court did anything in the Jencks case except
its plain duty? Lawyers, especially trial lawyers, should be com-
mending the Court for this decision.
These are some of the decisions of the Supreme Court which
are currently being criticized. I will not have the space to ana-
41 353 U.S. 657 (1957).
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lyze more of them, but believe that an examination of them will
show that the Court is requiring that defendants be convicted by
due process of law and is attempting to uphold the substantive
and procedural safeguards established by the Constitution, the
Bill of Rights and the Amendments which were adopted after
the Civil War. This the Court is required to do.
The New York Times, in an editorial, discussing the criticisms
of certain decisions of the Court said:
We live in a time of great stress, of great dangers, of a great
necessity for discipline. Nevertheless, the basic rights of our
society are not those of governments, or of any agents of govern-
ment, but of the individual. And the ultimate act of treason
is to despise those rights and undermine them, just as the ultimate
loyalty is to protect them and carry forward the great traditions
of democracy.
In speaking of the Supreme Court Mr. Justice Hughes on an
occasion commemorating the 150th Anniversary of the Court said:
It does most of its work without special public attention to
particular decisions. But ever and anon arise questions which
excite an intense public interest, are divisive in character, dividing
the opinion of lawyers as well as laymen. However, serious the
division of opinion, these cases must be decided. It should oc-
casion no surprise that there should be acute differences of opinion
on difficult questions of constitutional law when in every other
field of human achievement, in art, theology, and even on the
highest levels of scientific research, there are expert disputants.
The more weighty the question, the more serious the debate. The
more likely is the opportunity for honest and expert disagreement.
This is a token of vitality. It is fortunate and not regrettable that
the avenues of criticism are open to all, whether they denounce
or praise. This is a vital part of the Democratic process. The
essential thing is that the independence, the fearlessness, the
impartial thought, and conscientious motives of those who decide
should both exist and be recognized.
It might be well to remember the last few lines of Mr. Hughes
address when influenced by those so violently opposed to the
Court's decision in the Segregation Cases. The Chief Justice of
Pennsylvania, Justice Charles Alvin Jones, who wrote the opinion
in the Steve Nelson case42 in the State Court in commenting upon
the criticism of the opinion in that case on appeal written by the
United States Supreme Court, said:
The preponderant backing of the attack on the decision in the
Nelson case is made up of those who would undo the Supreme
Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education.




It is my considered judgment that nothing has occurred to
diminish confidence in our Courts, Federal or State, in litigation
between citizens or in those cases which involve individual liberty,
protected by the sacred guarantees of the Bill of Rights. The
administration of justice, according to law, in controversies be-
tween individuals, goes forward as steadily today as at any time
in the history of courts. Justice between men is in fact meted
out more surely because of the modernization of our procedures
and practices in compelling a full disclosure of the facts; State
and Federal Courts vigilantly uphold freedom of speech and
worship, the right of peaceable assembly, the right to have one's
home treated as his castle, the right to be free from unwarranted
searches and seizures, the right of bail and the right to trial by
jury, when life and liberty are involved; and the right to be repre-
sented by counsel. All of the rights of the individual are upheld
even in those cases involving subversive conduct which have lately
fretted the patience of our people. This, lawyers ought to announce
to their fellow citizens.
I would like, in conclusion, to repeat a paragraph from the
address of the Hon. Leonard A. Brockington, K.C. at Philadelphia,
at a meeting of the American Bar Association. He said:
The law in its majesty and its real grandeur is never on the
side of oppression or of violence or of unfaith or murder. In its
noblest moods it stands in compassion by the side of the Man
with the Hoe, in the cell of the persecuted and by the funeral
pyre of the martyr. It stands wherever a man holds his head
erect and speaks the truth that is within him. It stands wher-
eever great souls and minds fight against bigotry and darkness.
For the law is the language of freedom and of free men.
1038
